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Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between 
gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying 
cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, deci-
sion times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field the-
ory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed 
forty decision tasks of two gambles with two non-negative outcomes each. Information search 
was recorded using eye-tracking technology. Results for all dependent measures conflict with the 
prediction of the non-compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensa-
tory strategies. Choice proportions are well predicted by a cumulative prospect theory. Process 
measures, however, indicate that individuals do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted 
sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely 
on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models. 
Keywords: Risky Decisions, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Decision Field Theory, Priority Heu-
ristic, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction, Eye Tracking, Intuition 
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Risky decisions can be presented in the form of gambles comprising outcomes of different prob-
ability. According to classic expected utility models, individuals integrate outcomes and prob-
abilities in a compensatory way and select the option with the highest weighted sum (Edwards, 
1954; Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), which was suggested as an alterna-
tive to these models, sticks with the assumption of compensatory integration and additionally 
postulates (amongst other things) that the evaluation of outcomes is dependent on a (flexible) 
reference point. CPT specifies that the value V of gambles is calculated by the weighted sum of 
subjective utilities and probabilities for all possible outcomes and defines a weighting function 
π(pi) and a value function v(xi) that transform objective values xi and probabilities pi into sub-
jective ones. In contrast to the assumption of weighted compensatory integration made by these 
models, Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006) have argued that under certain conditions 
individuals might also use simple non-compensatory strategies (cf. Fishburn, 1974; Tversky, 
1972). They proposed the priority heuristic (PH) as an alternative model for risky choices, which 
is based on the sequential non-compensatory comparison of “reasons” extracted from gambles. 
Several recent findings challenge the validity of the PH and support weighted compensatory 
models such as CPT (for results conflicting with both PH and CPT see Birnbaum, 2008b). Using 
different kinds of computer-based information-search paradigms (cf. Payne, Bettman, & John-
son, 1988), it was found that in contrast to the predictions of the PH individuals search informa-
tion mainly within gambles (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, Exp. 3; Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 
& Willemsen, 2008),
1 make choices that follow a weighted compensatory information integra-
tion (Birnbaum, 2008a; Birnbaum & LaCroix, 2008; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a), and show deci-
sion times that increase with increasing similarity between the values V of the gambles (Glöck-
ner & Betsch, 2008a) as well as with increasing conflict between gambles (Hilbig, 2008). Fur-
thermore, from a more general perspective, Rieskamp (in press) showed that probabilistic mod-
els predict risky choices better than deterministic ones and that (a probabilistic version of) DFT 
also outperformed a generalized version of the PH.  
Taken together, these findings challenge the PH as a process model and as a paramorphic (“as-
if”) model (Hoffman, 1960). Although the results support compensatory models as paramorphic 
models, a closer inspection of the data corroborates the assumption that individuals might not 
apply them by deliberately calculating weighted sums. In decisions between two gambles, 
Glöckner and Betsch (2008a) observed an average decision time of 5.5 seconds and choices that 
mainly followed CPT. It is rather unlikely that participants conducted the necessary cognitive 
operations for the calculation of weighted sums deliberately (cf. elementary information proc-
esses, Lohse & Johnson, 1996; Payne et al., 1988). It seems more likely that strategies based on 
partially automatic processes were used instead (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008b; Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Sloman, 2002).  
                                        
1   For a different interpretation of the data by Johnson et al. (2008), see also Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and 
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In the current study, we pursued two goals: First, we wanted to test whether the findings against 
the PH also hold if one uses a refined methodology and further dependent variables. In the stud-
ies testing the PH, conflicting information search results have been captured using computerized 
information board paradigms in which information search is conducted by moving the mouse 
pointer to respective information cards. Recent evidence indicates that such a paradigm could 
influence decision strategies by limiting information search and hindering automatic processes 
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008c). Therefore, we intended to strengthen previous findings by readily 
presenting all pieces of information for the gambles on the screen and by recording information 
search with eye-tracking technology. Secondly, and more importantly, we aimed to improve our 
understanding of the processes underlying fast decision making under risk by testing several hy-
potheses (described in more detail later on) concerning information search derived from CPT, 
the PH, decision field theory (DFT) (Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004; Busemeyer & Townsend, 
1993) and parallel constraint satisfaction models (PCS) (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Holyoak & 
Simon, 1999; Thagard & Millgram, 1995). Taking into account findings on the relation between 
levels of processing and fixation durations, we try to show that automatic processes play a major 
role in risky decision making. In the next section the decision models considered in this work are 
outlined. To enhance reading, an overview of all acronyms and key features for the considered 
theories is provided in Table 1. Note that some theories (i.e., the PH and CPT) differ in their pre-
dictions for the domains of gains and losses. To reduce complexity, our theoretical considera-
tions focus on decisions between gambles with non-negative outcomes (i.e., gains) only. 
 
Table 1. Acronyms and Key Features of Considered Theories 
  
Theories 
Acronym Name  Key  Features 
CPT  Cumulative Prospect 
Theory 
Integration of subjective utility and subjective probability 
according to a weighted sum 
 
PH Priority  Heuristic 
Non-compensatory consideration of single reasons (i.e., 
minimum gain, probability of minimum gain, maximum 
gain) 
 
DFT  Decision Field Theory 
Evidence accumulation process; information sampling 
proportional to outcome probabilities 
 
PCS  Parallel Constraint Sat-
isfaction Models 
Construction of mental representations and automatic 
consistency maximizing by highlighting supporting evi-
dence for the favored option 
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The Priority Heuristic 
According to PH, individuals start decision making by screening all pieces of information. In this 
screening phase, the expected values of the gambles are roughly estimated and the PH is applied 
only if the expected values are similar (below a ratio of 1:2; Brandstätter et al., 2006). Aspiration 
levels (i.e., the minimum difference threshold between outcomes to consider them as being in-
deed different) are estimated by taking 1/10 of the overall maximum outcome rounded to the 
nearest prominent numbers (i.e., all powers of 10 including their halves and doubles). If the PH 
is applied, individuals look up “reasons” without integrating probabilities and outcomes. First, 
individuals look up and compare the minimum outcomes of both gambles. If these outcomes dif-
fer by more than the aspiration level, the gamble with the higher minimum outcome is instantly 
selected. Otherwise, probabilities of the minimum outcomes are investigated. If they differ by 
more than .10, the gamble with the lower probability for the minimum outcome is selected. If the 
difference in probabilities is smaller, the maximum outcomes are compared and the gamble with 
the higher one is selected. 
Thus, according to the PH, choices should follow a non-compensatory decision rule and decision 
times should increase with the number of reasons necessary to discriminate between options 
(Brandstätter et al., 2006). Information search should consist of an initial scanning, followed by a 
deliberate comparison of reasons. Hence, information search should be conducted between gam-
bles by comparing the minimum outcomes (and in some cases also the probability of minimum 
outcomes).  
Weighted Compensatory Theories 
According to CPT (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), individuals se-
lect the gamble with the highest value V which is calculated by: 
 ) ( ) ( i
i
i x v p V ∑ = π  (1) 
where the weighting function π(pi) is an inverse S-shaped function of the probabilities pi and the 
value function v(xi) is an S-shaped function of the outcomes xi. The CPT proposes the following 
equations for both functions (for non-negative outcomes): 
 
α x x v = ) (  (2) 
and 
 
γ γ γ γ π
/ 1 ) ) 1 ( /( ) ( p p p p − + = . (3) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated the parameters α = 0.88 and γ = 0.61. According to the 
theory, gambles (or prospects) are separately evaluated (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Informa-
tion should be sought within gambles and should be combined in a weighted additive manner 
according to equation 1. To be able to derive process predictions, we interpret CPT as a process 
model (although it might be usually considered to be a paramorphic model). We assume that the 
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weighted information integration is carried out in a stepwise manner that could be described by 
elementary information processes (i.e., specific information processing steps, Payne et al., 1988). 
Under this additional assumption, decision times should be rather high because the integration 
process (i.e., calculating weighted sums) is cognitively demanding and time-consuming. Fur-
thermore, decision time should be equal for decision tasks with an equal number of outcomes 
since the number of necessary elementary information processes is equal. Information search 
could be expected to be carried out by a deliberate stepwise consideration of information within 
gambles (after the initial editing phase, Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Thus, information search 
should be equally distributed over all outcomes. 
Another variant of compensatory theories is formalized in DFT (Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004; 
Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). According to DFT, decisions are not made by calculating 
weighted sums but by a stochastic sequential sampling and evidence accumulation process. Spe-
cifically, in a stochastic process, outcomes of options (e.g., gambles) are repeatedly sampled 
with the probability of their realization. The affective reactions to the outcomes of each option 
are evaluated and compared. These comparisons are accumulated over time to form a preference 
state. If the preference state for one option reaches a threshold, this option is selected. Thus, DFT 
predicts choices according to weighted compensatory integration of subjective utilities and prob-
abilities without relying on calculating weighted sums. Everything else being equal, decision 
time should decrease with increasing superiority of one option over the other and decisions 
should be made rather quickly by relying on automatic processes. Concerning the search for in-
formation, DFT predicts that outcomes are fixated proportionally to their probability and that the 
number of fixations increases with increasing probability of the respective outcome. Note that 
the probabilities of the outcomes of each gamble add up to one. Thus, according to DFT, both 
gambles should be inspected equally often. Furthermore, it could be expected that quick scan-
ning of information predominates because information integration is based on automatic proc-
esses.  
Another class of theories which predicts choices that approximate a weighted integration of 
probabilities and subjective utilities (without assuming that individuals calculate weighted sums) 
are PCS models. These models postulate that individuals form a mental representation of the de-
cision task which can be modeled by interactive activation networks (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; 
Holyoak & Simon, 1999; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; D. Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 
2004; Thagard, 1989). For decisions between two gambles with two (independent) outcomes, we 
suggest the network structure presented in Figure 1 (for similar models see also Glöckner, 2006, 
2007, 2008; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b). The evaluation of options and outcomes are represented 
as nodes that differ in their validity. Relations between them are represented by links. Option 
nodes are connected to each other by a strong inhibitory link indicating that only one of them can 
be selected. Outcome nodes are connected to the options by links of different strength which rep-
resent the subjective probability of each outcome. Outcome nodes are connected with a general 
valuation node by excitatory (i.e., positive outcomes) or inhibitory (i.e., negative outcomes) links 
of different strength which represent the a priori valuation of the outcome. As soon as the tempo-6 
rary network is constructed, activation spreads from the general valuation node which is simu-
lated as an iterative updating mechanism (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981). These PCS processes 
operate towards maximizing consistency in the network by changing the activation of the nodes. 
Initial advantages of one or the other option (e.g., gamble) are accentuated by automatically 
highlighting supporting information (i.e., good outcomes for the favored option) and by devalu-
ating contrary information (i.e., good outcomes for the non-favored option / bad outcomes for the 
favored option). As already mentioned, the models basically predict weighted compensatory in-
formation integration of subjective utilities and probabilities (Glöckner, 2006).
2 Decision time 
should decrease with increasing superiority of one option over the other (which of course makes 
consistency maximizing easier), and decision times should be short because decisions are based 
on automatic processing. Information search should be focused more strongly on the favored 
option since the respective evidence is highlighted and given bigger weight in the decision. 



















                                        
2   Mathematically this is due to the fact that activation spreads from the general valuation node to the outcome 
nodes via links that represent subjective values and from the outcome nodes to the options nodes via links 
that represent subjective probabilities (see Figure 1) according to the following iterative activation function 
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  ai(t) represents the activation of the node i at iteration t. The parameters floor and ceiling stand for the mini-
mum and maximum possible activation. Inputi(t) is the activation node i receives at iteration t, which is com-
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  Decay is a constant decay parameter. Activation is updated over a series of iterations i until a stable solution 
is found which means that activation of all nodes reach an asymptotic level and the overall consistency in the 
model does not change anymore. To simplify the model, we use fix values for some of the free parameters in 
the model. Floor and ceiling are set to -1 and +1, respectively, and a decay of .05 is used. The stability crite-
rion used for terminating the process is 10 cycles with no energy changes bigger than 10
-6. The only remain-
ing individual-specific parameters are connection weights which are calculated from subjective probabilities 





Figure 1. PCS network structure for decisions between two gambles with two independent outcomes 
each. The evaluation of gambles and outcomes are represented by nodes. The a priori valuations of out-
comes are represented by links of outcomes to the general valuation node. The subjective probabilities of 
outcomes are represented by links between the outcome nodes and gamble nodes. Activation spreads 
along the network and node activations a are updated according to an iterative PCS process until a con-
sistent and stable solution is found. The gamble with the higher final activation is chosen. 
 
 
Overall, the following hypotheses will be tested (see also Table 7): 
Choice Hypotheses 
H1a (PH): Choices in decision tasks follow a non-compensatory integration rule.  
H1b (CPT, DFT, PCS): Choices in decision tasks follow a weighted compensatory integration of 
subjective utilities/values and probabilities (i.e., expected utility / value V). 
Decision Time Hypotheses 
H2a (PH): Decision time increases with an increasing number of reasons that have to be consid-
ered. 
H2b (DFT, PCS): Decision time decreases with increasing superiority concerning expected utility 
/ value V of one option over the other. 
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Information Search Hypotheses 
H3a (PH): The amount of inspected information increases with an increasing number of reasons 
that have to be considered. 
H3b (CPT): The amount of inspected information is equal in all categories. 
H3c (DFT, PCS): The amount of inspected information increases with decreasing superiority 
concerning expected utility / value V of one option over the other. 
H4a (PH): Individuals start with initial screening and continue with a more thorough inspection of 
information.  
H4b (CPT): Individuals rely on a thorough sequential inspection of information. 
H4c (DFT, PCS): In the entire decision process, information search is mainly based on screening. 
H5a (PH): Information is mainly sought by comparing outcomes between gambles (i.e., between-
gamble transitions). 
H5b (CPT): Information is mainly sought within gambles (i.e., within-gamble transitions). 
H5c (DFT): Information is searched according to a random sampling process which leads to an 
equal number of within and between gamble transitions.  
H6a (PH): Fixations are mainly focused on the minimum outcomes. 
H6b (CPT): Fixations are equally distributed over all outcomes. 
H6c (DFT): Fixations are equally distributed over both gambles. 
H6d (PCS): Fixations are concentrated on the outcomes of the favored gamble.  
The decision time and information search hypotheses concerning CPT rest on the process as-
sumptions that (a) information is integrated according to a deliberate serial process and that (b) 
computations are always carried out with the same speed. Both assumptions were imposed to 
make the theory testable and were not originally made by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
Throughout the paper we also do not consider the editing phase which was lined out in the origi-
nal paper on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Note that the editing phase could 
contain a screening process so that CPT also predicts H4a. The PH hypothesis concerning the 
dominance of between gamble transitions (i.e., H5a) can only be derived under the assumption 
that there are not more within than between gamble transitions in the screening phase. Because 
PH does not specify information search in the screening phase, we assume a random search. This 
would result in an equal distribution of within and between gamble transitions and hence allow 
deriving H5a.  9 
Methodological Preliminaries 
To test our information search hypotheses we rely on an eye-tracking methodology which has 
been used to investigate processes in decision making since the 70ies (Lohse & Johnson, 1996; 
Russo, 1978; Russo & Rosen, 1975) (for reviews of eye tracking research in general, see Rayner, 
1978, 1998). In contrast to other research tools like computer based information board paradigms 
(Payne et al., 1988) and think-aloud protocols (Montgomery & Svenson, 1989; Russo, Johnson, 
& Stephens, 1989), eye-tracking has the advantage that it decreases the likelihood of influencing 
the decision process by the method itself. Process tracing methods such as information board 
paradigms sometime influence decision behavior (Billings & Marcus, 1983; Maule, 1994) and 
might hinder participants from relying on automatic processing by constraining quick compari-
sons and information search (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008c). Thus, eye-tracking studies provide 
more internally valid results particularly for decision tasks requiring information search in which 
information is readily available. 
Not only does eye-tracking allow for tracing information search without hindering automatic 
processes, but it also has the additional advantage that fixation durations can be used to provide 
insights into cognitive processes. Specifically, Velichkovsky et al. have argued that fixation time 
increases with an increasing level of processing (Velichkovsky, 1999; Velichkovsky, Rothert, 
Kopf, Dornhofer, & Joos, 2002). It has been shown that more superficial levels of processing 
such as screening are connected with relatively short fixations (up to 250 ms), whereas deeper 
processing such as deliberate consideration of information is related with longer fixations (>500 
ms). Velichkovsky, Challis, and Pomplun (1995) could for instance show that when comparing 
pictures, in an earlier phase of automatic information search and scanning short fixations prevail, 
whereas in a later phase, “when the crucial difference is about to be found, the fixation durations 
rise to 500ms and more. […] Obviously, this final phase of visual search can be attributed to 
some higher level of cognitive processing, which culminates in a conscious decision.” 
(Velichkovsky, 1999, p. 214). Furthermore, in driving simulations, it could be shown that the 
appearance of a critical event leads to a decrease in short (pre-attentive scanning) fixations and 
an increase in long (attentive processing) fixations (Velichkovsky, Dornhoefer, Pannasch, & Un-
ema, 2001). In a similar vein, eye-tracking research on language processing has shown that more 
automatic processes such as silent reading are related with shorter fixations (M = 225ms) 
whereas more effortful processes such as typing lead to longer fixations (M = 400ms) (Rayner, 
1998). Based on this literature, it seems reasonable to assume for this study that cognitive proc-
esses comprising conscious mathematical steps of information integration should go along with 
long fixations whereas scanning and automatic processes should produce mainly short fixations.  
Consequently eye-tracking technology allows investigating whether individuals mainly scan in-
formation (and rely on automatic, intuitive processes of information integration) or whether they 
compute information on a higher level of attention (and use more thorough deliberate compari-
son of information). This allows testing our information search process hypotheses (H4a-c). In the 
analysis, we categorize short fixations (<250 ms) as connected with scanning and automatic op-
erations, and longer fixations (>500 ms) as connected with deliberate operation. (Medium fixa-10 
tions of 251 up to 500 ms are, of course, also reported but they are not used to test specific hy-
potheses.) 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Eighteen students with different majors from the University of Bonn participated in the experi-
ment which was part of a 1.5-hour experimental battery. Participants signed a consent form in 
which they were informed that they could quit the experiment any time. They were paid €18 for 
participation. We used similar procedures and materials as in previous studies (Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008a, Exp. 1 & 3) except for the fact that this study was conducted using eye-tracking 
equipment. Participants completed 40 decision tasks which were manipulated using a within-
subjects design in which each respondent makes 8 similar decisions in each of the 5 categories of 
decision tasks. Examples for the five categories, their acronyms and key features are presented in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Acronyms and Key Features of the Decisions Tasks  
 
Categories of Decision Tasks 
Acronym Example  Key  Features 
CERTPRO 
A: .50, €30; .50, €40 
B: .30, €0; .70, €50 
One zero outcome for B; the certainty effect points pro A 
and all theories predict mainly choices for A  
 
CERTCON 
A: .40, €0; .60, €160 
B: .60, €10; .40, €220 
One zero outcome for A; the certainty effect points contra 
A; PH predicts A, all other theories predict B 
 
SIM 
A: .60, €50; .40, €60 
B: .40, €40; .50, €69 
All outcomes are very similar; value according to CPT is 
similar for both gambles 
 
MEDALM_CERT 
A: .90, €55; .10, €500 
B: .01, €0; .99, €100 
A has a high and a low outcome; in B a medium outcome 
is almost certain 
 
MEDCERT 
A: .98, €83; .02, €100 
B: .85, €38; .15, €340 
A leads to a medium outcome with certainty, B is risky 
and has a high and a low outcome 
Procedure and Materials 
The experiment was computerized. First, participants were familiarized with the decision task 
and instructed to select whichever of the two gambles they preferred (for the complete instruc-
tions, see appendix). Participants were instructed to make good decisions and to proceed as fast 
as possible.  
Each decision started with a blank screen (4 seconds) followed by a fixation cross (1 second), 
which centered the attention in the middle of the screen. Next, the gambles were presented in an 11 
ellipsoid display which assured that information was equally distant from the initial fixation 
point (Figure 2). Information was sorted so that the information for one gamble was presented on 
the left and for the other on the right side. Participants selected one of the two gambles by press-










Figure 2. Decision tasks between gambles with two outcomes each. Left outcomes belong to gamble 1, 
right outcomes belong to gamble 2.  
 
Eye movements were recorded using the Eyegaze binocular system (LC Technologies) with re-
mote binocular sampling rate of 120 Hz and an accuracy of about 0.45°. The system is based on 
pupil-center/corneal reflection method to determine eye gaze. This method captures voluntary, 
saccadic eye movements that fixate a target object on fovea. An infrared-sensitive video camera, 
positioned below the computer monitor, observes the subject’s eye and specialized image soft-
ware generates x, y coordinates for the gaze point on the monitor screen. Images were presented 
on a 17-inch color monitor (Samsung Synchmaster 740B, refresh rate 60 Hz, reaction time 5ms) 
with a native resolution of 1280 x 1024. Viewed from a distance of 60 cm, the screen subtended 
a visual angle of 28° horizontally and 21° vertically. Fixations were identified using a fixation 
radius of 20 pixels and a minimum fixation time of 50ms. 
Choices, decision times, fixation coordinates and durations were recorded as dependent vari-
ables. We defined non-overlapping areas of interest (AOI) around each piece of information (i.e., 
outcome and probability) with the size of 170 x 100 pixels. The number and duration of fixations 
within each AOI were calculated. Furthermore, all direct transitions of eye-fixations between 
AOIs (i.e., direct movements of fixation from one AOI to another one) were determined. Fixa-
tions were categorized as short (<250 ms), medium (251-500 ms) or long (>500 ms) fixations. 
As discussed above, short fixations below 250 ms are associated with scanning processes 
whereas more elaborated information processing is associated with long fixations of more than 
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Forty decision tasks (see appendix) were shown in fixed randomized order. The presentation or-
der of the gambles (i.e., gamble A first or gamble B first) and the order of outcomes within each 
gamble (i.e., low outcome first vs. high outcome first) were changed between trials to prevent 
gamble A from always being the gamble predicted by the PH. Each gamble had two non-
negative outcomes and the expected value for each pair of gambles was approximately equal. 
(Please note, that the (objective) expected value of a gamble (EV=Σvp) should not be equated 
with the (subjective) value V of CPT.) Thus, the conditions for the application of the PH were 
ideal: individuals were instructed to decide fast, expected values did not differ between gambles, 
and it was possible to screen the information quickly without limiting information search by the 
experimental procedure. The PH was also given the advantage that its information search predic-
tion (i.e., horizontal comparisons between gambles) was in line with the natural direction of 
reading (i.e., left to right). In contrast, the by CPT predicted search was not (i.e., vertical com-
parisons within gambles). The 40 presented decision tasks consisted of eight different versions of 
the five categories of decisions: CERTPRO, CERTCON, SIM, MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT (see 
Table 2). 
CERTPRO decisions always entail a zero outcome on gamble B. According to the certainty effect, 
individuals should avoid this outcome and select gamble A. Thus, all strategies (PH, CPT, DFT 
and PCS) predict mainly choices for gamble A. CERTCON decisions entail a zero outcome on 
gamble A but the PH nevertheless predicts the selection of this gamble because the difference to 
the minimum outcome of gamble B is small (i.e., below 1/10 of the maximum outcome) and the 
probability of the minimum outcome for gamble B is higher. In both categories, the zero-
outcome gamble has a considerably lower value V (calculated according to CPT) than the other 
gamble. In the SIM decisions, both gambles have similar outcomes and the values V of both 
gambles are roughly equal. Nevertheless, PH predicts all choices for gamble A. In the 
MEDALM_CERT and the MEDCERT decision a medium outcome is almost certain (i.e., gamble A) or 
can be reached with certainty (i.e., gamble B). The respective other gamble consists of a high 
and a low outcome. Again PH predicts all decisions for gamble A, whereas the considered com-
pensatory models predict choices for gamble A and B dependent on the parameters of the value 
and weighting function (for more details see Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a). In summary, the PH 
predicts a very high proportion of choices for gamble A in all categories, whereas CPT and the 
other compensatory models predict a high proportion of choices for gamble A in CERTPRO deci-
sions, a very low proportion in CERTCON decisions and a medium proportion in the remaining 
categories (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, Table 1). 
The PH predicts longer decision times in CERTCON decisions than in the remaining decisions 
because this category requires that at least two reasons have to be considered since the minimum 
gains do not differentiate according to the PH. Although the expected values of the compared 
gambles were equal, the compared gambles differed in value V according to CPT. In the SIM 
decision tasks the difference was small compared to the remaining categories. Hence, according 
to the weighted sum of subjective utilities and probabilities, the superiority of one over the other 13 
options was lower in the SIM decisions than in the remaining ones. PCS and DFT predict a 
higher decision time in this category compared to the other ones. 
Results 
Choices and Decision Times 
Average choices and decision times (Figure 3) replicate very closely the pattern observed by 
Glöckner and Betsch (2008a). Aggregated choices are in line with the predictions of CPT and 
conflict with PH predictions. A χ
2-test of independence between choices (Gamble A or B) and 
category turned out to be significant, χ
2(4, N=719)=118.5, p <.001, indicating significant differ-
ences in choice proportions between categories. Thus, the PH-hypothesis H1a has to be rejected. 
The proportion of choices for gamble A was no equally high for all categories. To test H1b, it was 
investigated whether the proportion of choices for gamble A in the category CERTPRO (CERTCON) 
was higher (lower) than in the remaining categories. Both tests turned out significant, χ
2(1, 
N=719)=77.4, p < .001 and χ
2(1, N=719)=58.4, p < .001, supporting H1b which states that aggre-
gated choices are in line with choice proportions predicted by compensatory models based on 
subjective value and probability. On an individual level, choices were in 59% of the tasks cor-
rectly predicted by PH and they were in 74% of the tasks in line with CPT
3 which replicates the 

































































































Category of Decision Task
 
Figure 3. Choice proportions and decision times by category of decision task. Extreme decision time out-
liers are excluded (M +/- 3SD). Error bars indicate .95 confidence intervals. Categories of decision tasks 
are described in Table 2. 
 
                                        
3   We considered CPT without individual parameter fitting using the two sets of parameters determined in ear-
lier work. Erev, Roth, Slonim, and Barron (2002) estimated the curvatures of the value function and the 
weighting function to be α = 0.33 and γ = 0.75. Based on a different data set, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
estimated the parameters to be α = 0.88 and γ = 0.61. For each participant the more predictive set was used. 14 
Decision times were analyzed using a repeated measurement analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with category as within-participants factor and log-transformed decision times as dependent 
variable. There was a significant effect of category on decision time, F(4, 68) = 15.2, p < .001, 
η
2=.43. Thus, the CPT prediction (H2c) that decision times are equal for all categories has to be 
rejected. The highest decision times were observed for the decision tasks in which the weighted 
sum of subjective values and probabilities of the options was relatively similar (i.e., SIM). Mean 
decision times excluding extreme outliers (i.e., M +/- 3SD) for the categories CERTPRO, CERT-
CON, SIM, MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT in seconds (SE in parentheses) were 8.4 (0.30), 9.7 
(0.30), 11.8 (0.31), 8.6 (0.30), and 8.8 (0.30) (see also Figure 3, right). A contrast testing the PH-
hypothesis (H2a) that decision times are higher for CERTCON than for the remaining categories 
(because only in this category the first reason does not differentiate between options) turned out 
to be not significant, F(1, 68) = 0.67, p = .42. The comparison between SIM and the remaining 
categories testing the DFT/PCS-hypothesis H2b was significant, F(1, 68) = 54.0, p < .001. Thus, 
choices are in line with the predictions by CPT, DFT, and PCS and decision times support DFT 
and PCS. Findings on both variables conflict with the predictions of the PH.  
Note that the mean decision time (M = 9.5s) was higher than in a previous study using the same 
set of decisions in a more conventional presentation format (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, Exp. 1: 
M = 5.5s) but lower than in a study in which information search had to be conducted using the 
computer mouse (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, Exp. 3: M = 12.1s). The difference between deci-
sion times for the standard line-format display and for the current study might be attributed to the 
fact that pieces of information were placed further apart from each other. The difference between 
the current study and the mouse-based information-search study indicates that eye-tracking 
might influence information search less than other information search paradigms (see also 
Glöckner & Betsch, 2008c; Lohse & Johnson, 1996). Note, however, that decision times seem to 
be merely rescaled by the paradigm and that the general pattern remains rather constant (i.e., 
there seem to be no interactions between research paradigm and dependent variables). This indi-
cates that the presentation format did not induce shifts in decision strategies. Finally, it is worth 
mentioning that the eye-tracking technology used in the current study induced considerably less 
variability in decision times (cf. SE within categories) as compared to the information-board 
paradigm (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, Exp. 3), which can be considered as an additional advan-
tage. 
Amount of Information Search (Fixations)  
Over all gambles, the average number of fixations for one decision was M=36.4 (SE=0.83) with 
87% of the fixations being in the eight AOIs. Thus, fixations were highly systematic and in each 
decision each piece of information (i.e., probability or outcome) was fixated approximately 4 
times. To test the CPT-hypothesis (H3b), which states that fixations are equally distributed over 
categories, a repeated-measurement ANOVA was calculated with category of decision task as 
factor and number of fixations in AOIs as dependent variable. We found a significant effect of 15 
category, F(4, 68) = 12.5, p < .001, η
2=.42. The mean fixations per category are shown in Figure 
4. To test the PCS/DFT-hypothesis (H3c) that there are more fixations in the category SIM than 
in the remaining categories, a contrast was calculated which turned out significant, F(1, 68) = 
46.1, p < .001, supporting hypothesis H3c. The PH-hypothesis (H3a) was tested by comparing the 
amount of information search between the category CERTCON and the remaining categories. Ac-
cording to the PH, there should be more information search in CERTCON decisions, which was 




































Category of Decision Task
 
Figure 4. Mean number of fixations per category. Error bars indicate .95 confidence intervals. Categories 
of decision tasks are described in Table 2. 
Fixation Duration Analysis  
The PH postulates that individuals start by initially screening the pieces of information and later 
on compare pieces of evidence (H4a). To test this initial screening hypothesis, individuals’ fixa-
tions for each decision were analyzed. For pragmatic reasons, we considered the first 40 fixa-
tions only and divided them in blocks of 8 fixations (Fix_Block) each. (We used blocks of 8 
fixations because 8 was the total amount of information available on the screen for each deci-
sion.) The first fixation on each decision screen was excluded from analysis because its position 
and length is likely to be biased by the previous fixation cross.
4 Hence, Fix_Block 1 consisted of 
                                        
4   The fixation cross was positioned in the middle of screen to assure that the initial fixation position was not 
biased in favor of single pieces of information. Exploratory data analysis nevertheless revealed that the first 
fixations often entailed a long fixation on the position of the fixations cross after it was removed. Usually, 
this fixation already started when the cross was still present. Since these fixations obviously did not represent 
information search of the decision process, we decided to remove all first fixations. The analyses concerning 
number of fixations and transitions were also calculated with and without first fixations which did not change 
results.  16 
fixations 2 to 9, Fix_Block 2 of the fixations 10 to 17 etc. To test the hypothesis that individuals 
start with initial screening, a χ
2-test of independence between Fix_Block and fixation duration 
(short, medium, long) was calculated (taking into account Fix_Block 1 to 5). Short fixations 
(<250 ms) can be expected for screening processes, whereas long fixations (>500 ms) can be 
expected for deliberate comparisons of outcomes between gambles. The test turned out to be sig-
nificant, χ
2(8, N=21178)=37.6, p < .001. Nevertheless, inspection of the data (Figure 5, left) re-
veals that besides a general decrease of the number of fixations over time, the interaction effect 
was due to an increase in medium fixations (Block 1: 26.4%; Block 5: 29.5%) and a decrease in 
short (Block 1: 67.8%; Block 5: 66.1%) and long (Block 1: 5.8%; Block 5: 4.4%) fixations. 
Thus, we found a significant effect in the opposite direction as the one predicted by the initial 
screening hypothesis (H4a). Our participants did not start by scanning all data and continued to 
compare values. In contrast, and in line with the PCS/CPT-hypothesis (H4c) scanning (i.e., short 
fixations) remained the predominant information search strategy over the entire course of deci-
sion making accounting rather constantly for about 67% of the fixations. This result also contra-


























































































Figure 5. The development of long, medium and short fixations (left) and the proportion of direct within or 
between gamble transitions in fixations (right) in a decision. Each fixation block summarizes eight fixa-
tions excluding the first fixation (e.g., Block 1: fixations 2 to 9, Block 2: fixations 10 to 17). 
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Information Search Process (Transitions) 
 Overall there were 15,378 direct transitions of fixations between AOIs. Eighty-three percent of 
these transitions (12,741) were within gambles and only 17% of the transitions turned out to be 
between gambles (2,637). Thus, per decision, on average 17.4 within gamble transitions and 3.7 
between gamble transitions were observed. This indicates that individuals, on average, looked up 
information gamble-wise and switched between gambles only 3 to 4 times. A χ
2-test revealed 
that there were significantly more within-gambles transitions than between gamble transitions, 
χ
2(1, N=15378)=6638.8, p < .001. Thus, the PH-hypothesis (H5a) which states that information 
search is mainly conducted between gambles and the null hypothesis derived from DFT (H5b) 
that there is an equal distribution of between and within gamble transitions have to be rejected.
5 
Data support the CPT-hypothesis (H5c) that information search is mainly conducted within gam-
bles.  
To investigate the development of transitions over time, we conducted a χ
2-test of independence 
between Fix_Block and fixation transition (within gamble vs. between gamble). The test turned 
out significant, χ
2(4, N=12841)=196.7, p < .001. Although being generally rather low, the num-
ber of between gamble fixation transitions increased over time indicating an increased amount of 
direct comparisons between gambles (Figure 5, right).  
Information Search Distribution (Attention)  
The level of attention that was given to certain aspects (i.e., outcomes, probabilities) of the gam-
bles was measured by the number of fixations to the respective AOIs and by the overall fixation 
duration in these AOIs (Pomplun, Ritter, & Velichkovsky, 1996). Note that decisions within 
each category of decision tasks have similar properties and therefore allow for an aggregated 
analysis. According to the PH, attention should be focused on the minimum outcomes (H6a). In 
contrast CPT predicts that attention should be equally distributed over all pieces of information 
(H6b). DFT predicts that attention should be proportional to the probabilities of the outcomes. 
Probabilities of the outcomes of each gamble add up to 1. Hence DFT predicts that the amount of 
information search for outcomes should not differ between gambles (H6c). PCS predicts that at-
tention is focused on the most favored option (and outcomes) because its advantages are high-
lighted (H6d).  
To test these hypotheses, separate regressions were calculated for each category of decision tasks 
with the number of fixations in the AOIs as dependent variable and gamble, outcome and the 
interaction of both as predictors. To account for dependencies of observation because of the re-
                                        
5   Please note that the high amount of within gamble transitions makes it unlikely that the PH hypothesis was 
falsely rejected because of many within gamble transitions in the screening phase only (see the assumptions 
underlying H5a mentioned above). A complete screening of all pieces of information would at best (from the 
PH perspective) produce 6 within gamble transitions and 2 between gamble transitions. We observed on av-
erage almost three times as many within gamble transitions, which is even significantly higher than this 
maximum estimation, t(17) = 7.87, p < .001.  18 
peated measurement design, standard errors were adjusted for clusters of dependent observations 
(i.e., participants) and robust standard errors were computed to account for violations of homo-
scedasticity.
6 Regression coefficients are shown in Table 3. Descriptive statistics for outcomes 
and probabilities are presented in Figure 6.  
Table 3. Regression for Number of Fixation 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






  (-4.19) (6.07) (-0.87) (-5.29) (-6.85) 
       




 (1.74)  (4.18)  (0.12)  (-3.38)  (-2.39) 
       
IE  Gamble*Outcome  0.0139 -0.618 0.0833  3.549
*** 0.375 
  (0.03) (-1.60) (0.30) (7.82) (1.29) 







 (8.99)  (9.58)  (9.41)  (11.23)  (16.20) 
Observations  576 576 576 576 576 
 
Note. Regression with number of fixations in Areas of Interest (AOIs) for outcomes (i.e., money) predicted 
by ‘Gamble’ (A=0, B=1), ‘Outcome’ (1
st = 0, 2
nd = 1), and the interaction of both (IE Gamble x Outcome). 
Regressions were conducted separately for the five categories of decision tasks (see Table 2). Analysis is 
based on 576 observations per category from 18 participants. To account for the repeated measurement 
design participants observations were clustered and robust standard errors were computed to account for 
violations of homoscedasticity. t statistics are given in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by 
* 
p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. 
 
The CPT-hypothesis (H6b) which states that information search is equally distributed over all 
outcomes and the DFT-hypothesis (H6c) that information search is equally distributed over gam-
bles were rejected for the categories CERTPRO, CERTCON, MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT. In all 
cases, there was a significantly stronger focus on the superior gamble (i.e., the gamble selected 
by the majority of participants), supporting the PCS-hypothesis (H6d). Note that in the remaining 
category SIM, no dominating option was available (i.e., both options were selected in about 50% 
of the cases). Thus, no difference was predicted by PCS.  
The PH-hypothesis (H6a) that information search is mainly focused on the minimum outcomes is 
not supported by the data. The significant main effect for outcome in the CERTCON decisions and 
the significant interaction in the MEDALM_CERT decisions indicate that the opposite is the case. In 
                                        
6   Standard errors were adjusted for clusters of repeated observations (i.e., dependence of error terms) using a 
random-effects model which allows for different correlations between error terms for each individual. Huber-
White robust standard errors were used to account for violations of the homoscedasticity assumption. Both 
are recommended standard functions of STATA and are implemented in supplementing regression com-
mands by the options “cluster(id)” and “robust” (see Gould, Pitblado, & Sribney, 2006; Hayes & Cai, 2007).  19 
these gambles individuals focused significantly less often on the minimum outcomes, particu-
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Figure 6. Fixations in Areas of Interest (AOIs) for the five categories of decision tasks averaged over the 
eight different gambles in each category (see Table 2). One example is presented in the lower left corner 
of each graph. ‘€’ indicates the Euro-outcome of the gamble, ‘p’ indicates the probability of this outcome. 
SE ranged from .11 to .39 with highest values in the SIM decisions.  
 
To further test the hypotheses H6 we analyzed aggregated log-transformed fixation times per 
AOI. Again a regression was conducted with log-fixation times as criterion, gamble, outcome 
and the interaction as predictors and correction for clustered observations and heteroscedasticity 
(Table 4). The descriptive aggregated fixations time data are provided in Figure 7.  20 
Table 4: Regression for Fixation Time 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






  (-4.16) (4.90) (-0.88) (-3.59) (-4.41) 
       




 (1.45)  (2.75)  (1.63)  (-2.60)  (-3.13) 
       
IE Gamble*Outcome  0.00545  -0.0722  -0.0154  0.478
*** 0.0389 
 (0.09)  (-1.23)  (-0.49)  (6.70)  (0.87) 







  (48.89) (37.20) (58.56) (46.49) (99.44) 
Observations  576 576 576 576 576 
 
Note. Regression with log-transformed aggregated fixation times in Areas of Interest (AOIs) for outcomes 
(i.e., money) predicted by ‘Gamble’ (A=0, B=1), ‘Outcome’ (1
st = 0, 2
nd = 1), and the interaction of both (IE 
Gamble x Outcome). Regressions were conducted separately for the five categories of decision tasks 
(see Table 2). Analysis is based on 576 observations per category from 18 participants. To account for 
the repeated measurement design participants, observations were clustered and robust standard errors 
were computed to account for violations of homoscedasticity. t statistics are given in parentheses. Signifi-
cance levels are indicated by 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. 
 
For the categories CERTPRO, CERTCON, MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT the null hypothesis was 
rejected that fixation times were equally distributed over gambles (H6b and H6c). Findings sup-
port the PCS-hypothesis (H6d) that participants fixate longer on the favored gamble. Again, there 
was a strong additional effect in the MEDALM_CERT decisions that the zero (or very low) outcome 
was focused much shorter than the remaining outcomes.  
Fixation times did not support the PH-hypothesis (H6a) that information search is mainly focused 
on minimum outcomes. For the category MEDALM_CERT the interaction turned out significant. 
The effect was mainly driven by a systematically lower fixation time for the minimum outcome 
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Figure 7. Log-transformed fixation time in Areas of Interest (AOIs) for the five categories of decision tasks 
averaged over the eight different gambles in each category (see Table 2). One example decision tasks is 
presented in the lower left corner of each graph. ‘€’ indicates the Euro-outcome of the gamble, ‘p’ indi-
cates the probability of this outcome. SE ranged from .02 to .07.  
 22 
To provide a more specific test for the PCS hypothesis H6d, which states that participants mainly 
focus on the favored gamble, we conducted two regressions using number of fixations and fixa-
tion time as dependent variables and individuals’ choices and the interaction of choices and 
gambles as additional predictors (Table 5). As predicted by PCS, the interaction of choice and 
gamble turned out highly significant in both regressions.  
Table 5: Regression Analysis for Fixations Dependent on Choice 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Number of Fixations  Fixation Time 
Choice 0.000537  0.0377 
 (0.00)  (1.69) 




 (-6.10)  (-6.90) 
    
IE Choice*Gamble  0.864
*** 0.153
*** 
 (4.06)  (6.20) 
    
Outcome 0.0751  0.00950 
 (0.69)  (0.47) 
    
IE Gamble*Outcome  0.677
*** 0.0860
*** 
 (5.20)  (5.22) 




 (10.23)  (59.34) 
Observations 2876  2876 
 
Note. Regressions with number of fixations (1) and aggregated fixation times (2) in Areas of Interest 
(AOIs) for outcomes predicted by ‘Choice’ (A=0, B=1), ‘Gamble’ (A=0, B=1), ‘Outcome’ (1
st = 0, 2
nd = 1), 
and the interactions of Choice x Gamble and Gamble x Outcome. Analysis is based on 2876 observations 
from 18 participants. To account for the repeated measurement design participants, observations were 
corrected for clusters and robust standard errors were computed to account for violations of homoscedas-
ticity. t statistics are given in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 




























































































Figure 8. Number of fixations (left) and fixation times (right) per gamble by choice.  
 
Furthermore, we tested the additional PCS prediction that individuals focus most strongly on 
particularly attractive outcomes (of the favored gambles) to increase their valuation. In the 
CERTPRO tasks, the second outcome of gamble A is particularly attractive because it pays a high 
amount of money and has a considerable probability. The same holds true for the second out-
comes in gamble B in the CERTCON tasks. In the MEDALM_CERT the almost certain medium out-
come (i.e., outcome 2) in gamble B is most attractive, and in the MEDCERT tasks, the medium 
outcome with the high likelihood is attractive (Gamble A, outcome 1). In SIM decision tasks 
there is no particularly attractive outcome. For pragmatic reasons we selected the second out-
come of gamble A which might be slightly more attractive to be included in the analysis. We 
compared the number of fixations to these most attractive outcomes with the fixations to the re-
maining outcomes within each gamble using single dummy coded variables as predictors (i.e., 
contrasts). As predicted by PCS, in all categories (except for SIM) the contrast turned out sig-
nificant (Table 6). In each of the regressions the value of the constant represents the mean num-
ber of fixations for the not considered outcomes and the beta weight for the dummy variable in-
dicates the additional fixations for the attractive outcome.  24 
Table 6: Regression for Fixation Frequency on most Attractive Outcomes  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Contrast CERTpro  CERTcon SIM  MEDalm  MEDcert 
      1.116
***  Gamble1 Out1 
vs. Others        ( 7 . 5 6 )  
       
1.278
*   0.218     Gamble1 Out2 
vs. Others  (2.87)   (1.03)    
       
 1.405
***  1.775
***   Gamble2 Out2 
vs. Others    (5.50)  (8.82)  







 (10.15)  (10.56)  (8.75)  (13.87)  (14.14) 
Observations  576 576 576 576 576 
 
Note. Regressions with frequency of fixations in Areas of Interest (AOIs) for outcomes predicted by 
dummy variables indicating 1 for the most attractive outcome in a category of gambles and 0 for the re-
maining outcomes (see Table 2). Analysis is based on 576 observations from 18 participants. t statistics 
are given in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. 
 
An overview of the results concerning the hypotheses is provided in Table 7. Overall, all PH hy-
potheses were either not supported or rejected, which makes it unlikely that the PH is an appro-
priate process model for decision making. To derive process predictions, we interpreted CPT as a 
process model according to which options are selected by calculating weighted sums. Under this 
assumption, four of six CPT hypotheses were rejected. For the DFT, four out of six hypotheses 
were supported by the data. Thus, DFT seems to be at least partially a good model to describe 
outcomes and decision processes although it seems that information search is done more system-
atically than postulated by the proportional random sampling process of outcomes. For the PCS 
model five of six predictions were supported and for one variable no prediction was made. Thus, 
in our study outcome and process variables are explained best by this model. 25 
Table 7: Overview of Results  
 
Model Hypothesis  Result 
H1: Choice proportion 
PH  Non-compensatory integration rule  Rejected 
CPT  Weighted compensatory integration of outcomes and probabilities  Supported 
DFT  Weighted compensatory integration of outcomes and probabilities  Supported 
PCS  Weighted compensatory integration of outcomes and probabilities  Supported 
H2: Decision time 
PH  Increases with increasing number of reasons that have to be considered  Not Supported 
CPT Equal  Rejected 
DFT  Decreases with increasing superiority of one option over the other  Supported 
PCS  Decreases with increasing superiority of one option over the other  Supported 
H3: Information search: amount of information 
PH  Increases with number of reasons  Not Supported 
CPT Equal  Rejected 
DFT  Increases with decreasing superiority of one option  Supported 
PCS  Increases with decreasing superiority of one option  Supported 
H4: Information search: screening vs. deeper processing 
PH  Start with initial screening and continue with a more thorough inspection  Rejected 
CPT  Thorough sequential inspection of information  Rejected 
DFT Mainly  screening  Supported 
PCS Mainly  screening  Supported 
H5: Information search: direction of transitions 
PH Between  gambles  Rejected 
CPT Within  gambles  Supported 
DFT Equal  Rejected 
PCS No  prediction  / 
H6: Information search: distribution of fixations / attention 
PH  Mainly on minimum outcomes  Rejected 
CPT  Equal over all pieces of information  Rejected 
DFT  Equal over gambles  Rejected 
PCS  Focus on the favored gamble  Supported 
 26 
General Discussion 
The reported study shows that the recently proposed PH cannot account for choice behavior on 
the outcome level or on the processing level. Individuals do not seem to use the proposed non-
compensatory decision rule in risky decisions. All PH-hypotheses concerning choices, decision 
time and information search were either not supported or directly rejected. Thus, our findings 
corroborate and extend previous investigations in a refined paradigm with open information 
presentation and with additional dependent measures derived from recording of eye-fixations.  
We found that weighted compensatory models such as CPT, DFT and PCS can better account for 
individuals’ choices. Decision times and the amount of information search increase with decreas-
ing differences in expected utilities or value V between gambles, even if the (objective) expected 
value is equal. This and other findings concerning information search (i.e., the predominant us-
age of short fixations and the unequal distribution of fixations over gambles) conflict with the 
idea that necessary calculations are deliberately conducted by computing weighted sums. Find-
ings concerning fixation durations indicate that over the entire decision process quick screening 
processes predominate. This suggests that automatic processes, as indicated by DFT and PCS, 
might play a more important role in decision making than deliberate calculations or simple com-
parisons as proposed by non-compensatory heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Longer fixa-
tions which are related to more thorough information processing are less often used.  
Against our findings, it might be argued that the predominance of short fixations was partially 
caused by the instruction to make good decisions and to proceed as fast as possible. Note, how-
ever, that it is usually assumed that increased time pressure leads to less information search and 
the application of non-compensatory strategies und should therefore increase application of PH 
(Edland & Svenson, 1993; Payne et al., 1988; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; Svenson & Maule, 
1993). According to these findings, individuals under time pressure should concentrate on a few 
(long) fixations. This is clearly not the case in our experiment. The current findings are in line 
with other work from our group which indicates that individuals, even under severe time pres-
sure, use compensatory strategies based on automatic processing instead of switching to non-
compensatory ones (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008c) under the condition that the research paradigm 
does allow for quick information acquisition.  
Interestingly, the proportion of long fixations decreases over time, which speaks against the hy-
pothesis that more deliberate comparisons are used after an initial screening. Individuals seem to 
investigate information more thoroughly in the beginning and make relatively more medium 
length comparisons later on. In line with the prediction of CPT, information is clearly sought 
within gambles. Participants seem to evaluate each gamble separately and switch between gam-
bles only a few times. This indicates that holistic impressions of each gamble are formed and 
compared. The level of attention to outcome information operationalized by the number of fixa-
tions and decision times is not equally distributed over gambles. Individuals focus more strongly 
on the favored options and on particularly attractive outcomes. This supports the PCS-
hypotheses that a) the positive aspects of the favored option are highlighted by investigating 27 
them repeatedly and that b) particularly attractive outcomes (that usually speak for the preferred 
gamble) are highlighted and taken into account more strongly.  
One of the central assumptions of DFT is that the calculation of weighted sums of outcomes and 
probabilities is circumvented by a stochastic sampling and evidence accumulation process. Our 
findings concerning the distribution of fixations (i.e., focus on favored gamble) and the direction 
of information search (i.e., search within gamble) speak against the validity of this assumption. 
Nevertheless, it might be argued that eye-fixations cannot be equated with instances of evidence 
accumulation. Individuals might investigate information once and retrieve them later on from 
memory. The fact that participants inspected pieces of information approximately four times and 
in a rather systematic manner, however, speaks against this interpretation. Furthermore, it can be 
expected that memory storage and retrieval for 8 pieces of information is cognitively effortful 
(cf. H. A. Simon, 1974). It is more likely that individuals relied on the less effortful strategy by 
looking up information directly. Although supporting DFT partially, our findings indicate that 
some of the assumptions of DFT, particularly predictions concerning stochastic information 
search, might have to be revised. 
The PCS approach accounts well for the findings and seems to be a promising starting point for 
further investigations of decision processes in risky choices. Although there have been several 
attempts to apply PCS to decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; 
D. Simon, Krawczyk et al., 2004; D. Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004; Thagard & Millgram, 1995), 
the PCS approach can be criticized for still being not sufficiently well specified. Up to now in-
cluding the present study, mainly qualitative predictions on the aggregated level have been de-
rived and tested (e.g., coherence shifts, decision times, choices, confidence). For further re-
search, there is a need for testing more specific hypotheses on an individual level. 
Furthermore, our results could be criticized in that the specific presentation format necessary for 
valid eye-recording might have influenced decision strategy and information search. It could for 
instance be argued that the comparison of probabilities was easier than the comparison between 
outcomes, because the former were presented closer to each other. Although this caveat has to be 
seriously considered, we argue that in eye-tracking studies the increases in costs for information 
search because of (minimal) increases in distance between pieces of information is rather low. 
Hence, such small changes should not influence decision strategies if it holds true that they are 
selected based on considerable learning experience (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Moreover, as al-
ready mentioned above, our results concerning choice proportions and the pattern of decision 
times closely replicate the results observed with the same material in a study using the classic 
presentation format (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, Exp. 1) which speaks against an influence of the 
presentation format on the decision strategy. Concerning our measures of information search we 
can, however, not completely rule out this possibility. The relation of transitions within vs. be-
tween gambles replicates results from a previous study using the same presentation format 
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, Exp. 3); compared to Johnson et al. (2008), however, we observed a 
higher proportion of within gamble transitions which might indicate a certain dependence of the 
results on presentation format. The observed difference can, however, not only be attributed to 28 
the presentation format; it could also be due to numerous other differences between the studies 
(e.g., structure of the selected tasks). A clarification of these issues shall be subject to further 
research. 
In the current study, we investigated the processes underlying risky decisions by using an open 
information presentation format and eye-tracking technology. We extend previous research on 
decision process measurements by using fixation durations and relating them to information 
processing. In line with findings by Glöckner and Betsch (2008c), the results highlight the im-
portance of automatic processes in decision making and the necessity for methods that do not 
hinder their application. Converging findings on other dependent variables (i.e., choices, deci-
sion times and other parameters of information search) provide evidence that the more elaborated 
analysis of fixation times leads to valid results. Nevertheless, further research with focus on 
methodological issues will be necessary to provide additional support for our conclusions.  
Our results might be summarized as follows: to predict aggregated choice proportions in risky 
decisions with two gambles and two outcomes, CPT is a reasonably good (paramorphic) model. 
To account for the underlying processes and individual choice behavior, DFT and PCS models 
might be more suitable, but in DFT some of the assumptions concerning stochastic information 
search might have to be rethought. Simple non-compensatory models such as the PH seem to be 
less appropriate for predicting choices and describing processes. Overall, automatic processes 
seem to play an important role in risky decisions and a combination of open information presen-
tation and eye-tracking seems to be a promising approach to investigate them.  
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Appendix 
Instruction 
You will be repeatedly presented with pairs of gambles. You should decide which of the gambles 
you would prefer to play. Each gamble has exactly two possible outcomes, A and B, which have 
some given probability of coming about. Each outcome leads to a certain monetary gain, which 
is given in Euro. [Example omitted] This means that in gamble 1 you have a 30% chance of win-
ning €10 and a 70% chance of winning €20, and so on. Your task is to select the gamble you pre-
fer. Press “y” to select gamble 1 and press “m” to select gamble 2. [page break] If you have any 
questions, please ask the experimenter; otherwise press continue [page break] Please note: try to 
make accurate decisions and to proceed as quickly as possible. Put the left finger on “y” and the 
right finger on “m” and press both keys to start the decision phase. 
Decision Tasks 
Table A1 shows the 40 decision tasks used in our experiment. Each decision task consists of two 
gambles A and B (columns), two possible outcomes (Out 1 and Out 2) and their probabilities 
(rows). The five main columns represent the different categories of the decision task. Each cate-
gory consists of eight different decision tasks that are presented in rows. The expected value for 
each pair of gambles is approximately the same. All gambles are coded, so that gamble A is pre-
dicted by the PH and, in each gamble, outcome 1 is lower than outcome 2. In the presentation, 
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